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High-density and Secure Data Transmission
via Linear Combinations
Preliminary version
Vince Grolmusz ∗
Abstract
Suppose that there are n Senders and n Receivers. Our goal is to send long messages
from Sender i to Receiver i such that no other receiver can retrieve the message intended
for Receiver i. The task can easily be completed using n private channels between the
pairs. Solutions, using one channel needs either encryption or switching elements for
routing the messages to their addressee.
The main result of the present work is a description of a network in which The Senders
and the Receivers are connected with only no(1) channels; the encoding and de-coding
is nothing else just very fast linear combinations of the message-bits; and there are no
switching or routing-elements in the network, just linear combinations are computed,
with fixed connections (channels or wires).
In the proofs we do not use any unproven cryptographical or complexity theoretical
assumptions.
1 Introduction
Suppose that there are given n Senders S1, S2, . . . , Sn and n Receivers R1, R2, . . . , Rn. Our
goal is to send long messages from Si to Ri, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n such that
(a) Ri can easily retrieve the message of Si, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n
(b) Ri cannot retrieve the message of Sj for any j 6= i.
An obvious method for doing this is connecting Si with Ri with private channels, that
is, we need n parallel channels for the n Senders and the n Receivers. The advantage of this
solution is that n bits can be sent in parallel, and the transmission is private, in the sense
that Ri receives only the transmission of Si, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Another obvious solution is that all the Senders and Receivers use the same channel, and
they transmit their messages one after the other, but in this case some sort of encryption
should be used for the maintaining the privacy of the transmission.
The main result of the present work is a description of a network in which
(i) The Senders and the Receivers are connected with only no(1) channels1
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1Here o(1) denotes a quantity which goes to 0 as n goes to the infinity.
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(ii) The encoding and de-coding is nothing else just linear combinations of the message-bits,
and this linear combinations can be computed very fast,
(iii) There are no switching or routing-elements in the network, just linear combinations are
computed, with fixed connections (channels or wires),
(iv) Ri cannot learn much about any bit of the message of Sj for any j 6= i, and can learn
only a negligible amount of information on longer messages of Sj;
(v) In the proofs we do not use any unproven cryptographical or complexity theoretical or
any other assumptions.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The dot-product
We have defined the alternative, and the 0-a-strong and the 1-a-strong representations of
polynomials in [2]. Note that the 0-a-strong representation, defined here, coincides with the
a-strong representation of the paper [1].
Note also, that for prime or prime-power moduli, polynomials and their representations
(defined below), coincide. That may be the reason that such definitions were not given prior
to [2].
Definition 1 Let m be a composite number m = pe11 p
e2
2 · · · peℓℓ . Let Zm denote the ring of
modulo m integers. Let f be a polynomial of n variables over Zm:
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) =
∑
I⊂{1,2,...,n}
aIxI ,
where aI ∈ Zm, xI =
∏
i∈I xi. Then we say that
g(x1, x2, . . . , xn) =
∑
I⊂{1,2,...,n}
bIxI ,
is an
• alternative representation of f modulo m, if
∀I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n} ∃j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ℓ} : aI ≡ bI (mod pejj );
• 0-a-strong representation of f modulo m, if it is an alternative representation, and,
furthermore, if for some i, aI 6≡ bI (mod peii ), then bI ≡ 0 (mod peii );
• 1-a-strong representation of f modulo m, if it is an alternative representation, and,
furthermore, if for some i, aI 6≡ bI (mod peii ), then aI ≡ 0 (mod m);
Example 2 Let m = 6, and let f(x1, x2, x3) = x1x2 + x2x3 + x1x3, then
g(x1, x2, , x3) = 3x1x2 + 4x2x3 + x1x3
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is a 0-a-strong representation of f modulo 6;
g(x1, x2, , x3) = x1x2 + x2x3 + x1x3 + 3x
2
1 + 4x2
is a 1-a-strong representation of f modulo 6;
g(x1, x2, , x3) = 3x1x2 + 4x2x3 + x1x3 + 3x
2
1 + 4x2
is an alternative representation modulo 6.
In other words, for modulus 6, in the alternative representation, each coefficient is correct
either modulo 2 or modulo 3, but not necessarily both.
In the 0-a-strong representation, the 0 coefficients are always correct both modulo 2 and
3, the non-zeroes are allowed to be correct either modulo 2 or 3, and if they are not correct
modulo one of them, say 2, then they should be 0 mod 2.
In the 1-a-strong representation, the non-zero coefficients of f are correct for both moduli
in g, but the zero coefficients of f can be non-zero either modulo 2 or modulo 3 in g, but not
both.
In [2] we proved the following theorem:
Theorem 3 (i) Let m = p1p2, where p1 6= p2 are primes. Then a degree-2 1-a-strong
representation of the dot-product
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn, y1, y2, . . . , yn) =
n∑
i=1
xiyi
can be computed with
exp(O(
√
log n log log n)) (2)
multiplications.
(ii) Moreover, the representation of (i) can be computed on bilinear ΣΠΣ circuits of size
(2).
In other words, we have shown, that instead of the usual dot-product
n∑
i=1
xiyi
we can compute a polynomial of the form
n∑
i=1
xiyi + 3g(x, y) + 4h(x, y) (3)
where both g and h has the following form:∑
i 6=j
aijxiyj, aij mod 6 ∈ {0, 1},
and no term xiyj appears in both f and g.
Moreover, by (ii), (3) can be computed as the sum:
t∑
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
bijxi
)(
n∑
i=1
cijyi
)
(4)
where bij, cij ∈ {0, 1} and t = exp(O(
√
log n log log n)) = no(1).
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3 The main idea
In this short preliminary report we are dealing with only the case, when the modulus is 6.
Our results can easily be generalized for other non-prime-power composite moduli as well.
Polynomial (3) can be computed in form (4). Let us consider a fixed x ∈ {0, 1}n, and let
us compute z = (z1, z2, . . . , zt) ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}t , where
zj =
n∑
i=1
bijxi mod 6 (5)
that is, simply a linear combination, determined by (4), for j = 1, 2, . . . , t. Or, in matrix
notation, where B = {bij} denotes an n× t matrix,
z = xB mod 6.
Certainly, different x’s may lead to the same z, since t = no(1) << n.
Now, from (4), the 1-a-strong representation of the dot-product of x with any substitution
of the y’s can be computed from the t = no(1) values of z. In particular, plugging in
y(i) = (0, 0, . . . ,
i︷︸︸︷
1 , 0, . . . , 0),
we will get modulo 6 the following polynomial:
xi + 4(xi1 + xi2 + · · · + xiℓ) + 3(xj1 + xj2 + · · ·+ xjk) (6)
where different indices denote different numbers.
Or, in other words, with the notation of C = {cij} as an n× t matrix of cij entries from
(4),
x′ = x+ 4xU + 3xV = xBCT = zCT ,
where U and V are some n× n
4 Hyperdense transmission
We describe the transmission-protocol in rounds. In every round, every sender Si will transmit
securely a bit xi to the corresponding receiver, Ri, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. In u consecutive rounds,
every sender will send u bits, that is, sending u-bit messages needs u rounds of the following
protocol.
A round is performed as follows:
Step 1 - Encoding - From the bits of x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn the mod 6 integers z =
(z1, z2, . . . , zt) is computed by linear combinations taken modulo 6:
z = xB mod 6,
Step 2 - Transmission - The mod 6 numbers z1, z2, . . . , zt are sent on t channels to the
receivers.
Step 3 - Decoding - The linear transformation x′ = (x′1, x
′
2, . . . , x
′n) = zCT is computed
modulo 6 at the receivers’ side, and number x′i is given to receiver Ri, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (Note,
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that because of the obvious information-theoretical reasons, generally it is not possible to
retrieve bit xi from integer x
′
i).
Step 4 - Pre-Filtering - A random π : {1, 2, . . . , n} → {1, 2, . . . , n} permutation is gener-
ated at the senders’s side. Then for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, if xπ(j) is 1, then Steps 1, 2 and 3 are
repeated for xπ(j) ∈ {0, 1}n instead of x, where xπ(j) coincides with x, except on position
π(j), whereas xπ(j) is 0. Let x′′i denote the coordinate i of xπ(j)BC
T . On the other hand, if
xπ(j) is 0, then nothing happens.
Step 5 - Post-Filtering - Now, receiver Ri stores value x
′
i in its memory, and, additionally,
sets register ri = x
′
i, and follows the following program after receiving any new x
′′
i , originating
in Step 4:
if x′′i = x
′
i it does nothing;
if x′′i = x
′
i − 1 then Ri concludes that xi = 1;
if x′′i ≡ x′i − 3 then sets ri = ri − 3 mod 6;
if x′′i ≡ x′i − 4 then sets ri = ri − 4 mod 6;
if Ri never got in the round an x
′′
i for which x
′′
i = x
′
i − 1, then it concludes that xi = 0.
After finishing the repetitions described in Step 4, the value of xi and the mod 6 value of
ri should be the same; otherwise Ri outputs: ERROR. This property can also be used for
error-detection in the protocol.
Theorem 4 After performing one round, receiver Ri retrieves the bit xi, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Proof: Clearly, x′i is equal to quantity (6); so decreasing any non-zero xj in the sum of (6)
by 1, leads to either a decrease of 1 of the sum (in the case when exactly xi was decreased,
or by 0 (when an xj was decreased with a 0 coefficient in (6)), or by 4 or 3 modulo 6, (when
the coefficient of the decreased variable was 4 or 3, respectively). If we subtract from x′i all
the xj’s with coefficients 3 or 4, then xi will remain. ✷
4.1 An alternative filtering method
The following modification of the filtering steps of the protocol relies on the fact that if we
one-by-one increase the value of r, then 3r will have period 2, and 4r will have period 3
modulo 6, but r itself will have period 6, modulo 6.
So, we can modify Steps 4 and 5 as follows:
Step 4’ - Pre-filtering-variant- A random π : {1, 2, . . . , n} → {1, 2, . . . , n} permutation is
generated at the senders’s side. Then for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, if xπ(j) is 1, then Steps 1, 2 and 3
are repeated for six values of xπ(j) ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}n instead of x, where xπ(j) coincides with
x, except on position π(j), whereas xπ(j) is takes on values 0,1,2,3,4, and 5, one after the
other. Let x′′i denote the coordinate i of xπ(j)BC
T . On the other hand, if xπ(j) is 0, then
nothing happens.
Step 5’ - Post-Filtering-variant - Receiver Ri stores value x
′
i in its memory, and follows
the following program after receiving the 6 new x′′i ’s in Step 4:
if if the period of x′′i is 6 then Ri concludes that xi = 1;
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if if the period of x′′i is less than 6 then it does nothing
If it never realized in the turn that the period is 6, then Ri concludes that xi = 0.
Note, that this filtering method can be more applicable than the original in electrical-
engineering applications.
5 The Security of the network
The security of the network-protocol relies on the independently generated random permu-
tations π in each round.
Let us review, what Ri can learn from the bits, addressed to others. Clearly, Ri will know
the number of the 1-bits with coefficient 4 and also the number of the 1-bits with coefficient
3 in (6), but Ri will not know the identity of the 1-bits.
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